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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a visit to a small business-from the local, fast order food
shop to the dry cleaner and gas station-is an integral part of everyday
living, small businesses play an underappreciated role in the United
States economy. For example, most business news stories involve large,
publicly traded companies. However, the number of small businesses
vastly overshadows the number of large businesses. In addition, small
businesses' contribution to the United States economy is overshadowed
by media reports of ethical conflicts and potentially unlawful conduct at
larger businesses. According to the Small Business Administration
Office of Advocacy, in 2006 there were an estimated "29.6 million
businesses in the United States. Small firms with fewer than 500
employees represent[ed] 99.9 percent of those businesses"' and 73.3
2
percent of US businesses had no employees. As of 2006, only 18,000
firms qualified under Small Business Administration criteria as large
firms. Even though large firms account for about half of the nonfarm
private gross domestic product, small firms:
* Employ just over half of all private sector employees.
* Pay 44 percent of total U.S. private payroll.
* Generated 65 percent of net new jobs over the past 17 years.
1. See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS. ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 *2009), http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf (last visited Aug.
2, 2010).
2. Id. (stating that, out of the 27.5 million businesses in the U.S., 21.4 million
business have no employees). Under the Small Business Administration definition of
small business, a small business has "fewer than 500 employees" or less than a certain
amount in receipts where the amounts vary by industry. See also U.S. SMALL Bus.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, TABLE OF SMALL BUSINESS SIZE STANDARDS MATCHED TO
NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS CODES (2008),
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba homepage/serv_sstdtablepdf pdf
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010). Under the Small Business Administration definition of small
business, a small business has "fewer than 500 employees" or less than a certain amount
in receipts where the amounts vary by industry.
3. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 1.
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* Hire 43 percent of high tech workers (scientists, engineers,
computer programmers, and others).
* Are 52 percent home-based and 2 percent franchises.
* Made up 97.5 percent of all identified exporters and
produced 31 percent of the known export value in FY 2008.
* Produce 13 times more patents per employee than large
patenting firms.4
The phrase "small business" conjures up images of the sole business
owner, the "mom and pop" shop, and the closely-held business with a
small number of owner/managers. These enterprises generally are not
subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 ("Exchange Act")
periodic disclosure requirements-including certain provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20026 ("Sarbanes-Oxley")-that apply to
publicly-traded companies.7  However, a publicly-traded company is
subject to the Exchange Act rules regardless of the size of the business.8
For example, on a quarterly and annual basis, all publicly-traded
companies, including a "smaller reporting company," must disclose
financial information to the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC").9 For purposes of the Exchange Act's disclosure requirements,
a smaller reporting company is defined as a business that "had a public
float of less than $75 million .. . or [i]n the case of an issuer whose
4. Id.
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(k) (2006).
6. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
7. See id at §§ 302, 401, 404, 409. "Publicly-traded companies" refers to
companies whose shares are traded on a national stock exchange, e.g., the New York
Stock Exchange. By contrast, privately-held businesses are not traded on a national
exchange.
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (requiring that an issuer register securities prior to
those securities trading on a national securities exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (requiring
that issuers file periodic information reports); see The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pub.
L. No. 107-204 §§ 302, 401, 404, 409 (2002) (stating that certain Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements previously postponed for small businesses-in particular the internal
controls attestation and management sign-off-now apply to small, publicly-traded
companies); see also, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: A Guide for Small Businesses, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N., Jan. 22, 2008,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/404guide.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)(2). Under regulations effective in 2008, small business
issuers (those previously defined as having less than $25 million in revenue and publicly
held stock worth no more than $25 million) are included with non-accelerated filers
(those defined as having a public float of no more than $75 million) in the category of
smaller business issuers. See also SEC RELEASE No. 33-8876: SMALLER REPORTING
COMPANY REGULATORY RELIEF AND SIMPLIFICATION 8, 12 (2007),
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8876.pdf [hereinafter Smaller Reporting Company
Release].
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public float . .. was zero, had annual revenues of less than $50
million. . . ."1o
Over the past ten years, equity and debt capital have moved away
from small businesses for myriad reasons, including tougher SEC
requirements for small business stock issuances, more stringent bank
lending requirements as a result of the Great Recession of 2008, and
Sarbanes-Oxley." Recently, President Barak Obama's administration
has recognized the need to focus on freeing up credit for small
businesses. 12  In addition, the SEC-whose mission is "to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation" "-has renewed its attention to small businesses in
light of calls to reform Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that apply to small and
medium-sized enterprises.14
The executive branch's attention to small businesses is well-timed
for two reasons. First, even though the United States recession is
officially over, employment rates have not recovered.15 Small businesses
have led the economy out of past recessions because small businesses
have driven post-recessionary employment.16  Second, nearly two and
10. See Smaller Reporting Company Release, supra note 9. Under the Securities and
Exchange Act, public float is defined as "the aggregate market value of the issuer's
outstanding voting and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates." 17 C.F.R. §
240.12(b)(2), Definitions: Small Business Issuer.
11. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
12. See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Weekly Address: President
Obama Says Small Business Must Be at the Forefront of the Recovery, Oct. 24, 2009,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-
obama-sayssmall-business-must-be-forefront-recovery (stating, "[I] also announced that
we'll be taking additional steps through our Financial Stability plan to make more credit
available to the small local and community banks that so many small businesses depend
on-the banks who know their borrowers, who gave them their first loan and watched
them grow.").
13. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N., Oct. 20,
2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.
14. See, e.g., Smaller Reporting Company Release, supra note 9; see also FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (2006), available at www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].
I5. See Dean Maki, Examining Influences That May Impact the Fed's Decision for
Interest Rates, NIGHTLY Bus. REPORT, Aug. 9, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/
nbr/site/onair/transcripts/nbr-transcripts_ 00809/?utm source=feedbumer&utm medium
=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+pbs%2Fnbr-programs+%28nbr-programs%29 ("The
Fed's policies are bringing the unemployment rate gradually down. It will continue to
fall. Whereas the public just sees the unemployment rate as very high, which it is. So in
a way it's the difference between the trend in the unemployment rate and its still high
level.").
16. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER & KAREN G. MILLS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCING FORUM 18 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/
idc/groups/public/documents/sba homepage/small bussfinanforumreport.pdf.
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one-half years after the start of the Great Recession, and nearly two years
after Lehman Brothers' collapse triggered an unprecedented period of
industry bailouts, bank failures, corporate bankruptcies, mortgage
defaults, credit tightening and high unemployment, President Obama
signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"), 7 "the most sweeping financial
industry reform legislation since the Great Depression." 8  Most
commentary has focused on the law's effect on large financial
institutions and on the law's consumer protection provisions.19 However,
the Dodd-Frank Act also contains corporate governance, executive
compensation and risk management provisions that apply to publicly-
traded companies. 2 0 The Dodd-Frank Act may affect small businesses in
two ways: (1) the business is publicly-traded and must comply with the
act; or (2) businesses required to comply with the act change their
business practices in response to Dodd-Frank Act regulations, and those
practices trickle down and become norms of conduct for small businesses
that either are exempt from a particular provision or are privately-held
and thus not covered by the act. Thus, an unintended consequence of the
Dodd-Frank Act may be that the act adversely affects small businesses at
a time when those businesses, and the economy as a whole, can least
afford it.
This Article proposes that legislators and regulators should learn
from the experience of how Sarbanes-Oxley affected small businesses-
those that are publicly traded and those that are not-and devise financial
regulatory reforms with those experiences in mind. It does not assert that
Sarbanes-Oxley and consequent business practice changes unfairly and
adversely affected small businesses, although the reforms' costs clearly
are proportionately higher for small businesses and are easier to quantify
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010).
18. Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform into Law, CBS
NEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET, Jul. 21, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_ 162-
20011201-503544.html (last visited Jul. 25, 2010).
19. See Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES, Jul.
22, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz af_0722sarbanes.html (last visited Aug.
10, 2010); Larry Bumgardner, Reforming Corporate America: How Does the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Impact American Business?, GRAZIADIO BUSINESS REPORT, 2003,
gbr.pepperdine.edu/031/sarbanesoxley.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2010); Paul
Lowengrub, The Impact of Sarbanes Oxley on Companies, Investors, & Financial
Markets, SARBANES OXLEY COMPLIANCE JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.s-ox.com/
dspgetFeaturesDetails.cfn?CID= 1141 (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173
§§121, 165, 813, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 971, 972.
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than the benefits.2 1 Indeed, this Article proposes a cost/benefit analysis
to examine: (1) the Dodd-Frank Act's effect on small businesses
expressly required to comply with the reforms; and (2) the act's impact
on small businesses affected by changes in business practices and
advisors, because whether intended or unintended, legislated or trickled
down, the benefits of regulation exist. Further, that cost-benefit analysis
ideally should occur either before the implementation of regulations or,
at the latest, in the early stages of implementation. For example, in
2005-three years after Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment-the SEC charged
the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies (the "Advisory
Committee") with the task of:
assess[ing] the current regulatory system for smaller companies under
the securities laws of the United States, and mak[ing]
recommendations for changes. The Charter also directed that [the
Advisory Committee] specifically consider the following areas of
inquiry, including the impact in each area of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of2002:
* frameworks for internal control over financial reporting
applicable to smaller public companies, methods for
management's assessment of such internal control, and
standards for auditing such internal control;
* corporate disclosure and reporting requirements and federally
imposed corporate governance requirements for smaller public
companies, including differing regulatory requirements based
on market capitalization, other measurements of size or market
characteristics;
* accounting standards and financial reporting requirements
applicable to smaller public companies; and
* the process, requirements and exemptions relating to offerings
of securities by smaller companies, particularly public offerings.
22
More generally, the Advisory Committee was charged with
evaluating whether the overall regulatory structure's benefits were
commensurate with small businesses' compliance costs. 23 Further, the
21. Christopher Cox, Testimony: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: New Evidence on the
Cost for Small Companies, SEC. ExCH. COMM'N., Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/2007/ts 121207cc.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
22. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, pp. 1-2.
23. Id.
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Advisory Committee was asked to find ways to minimize costs and
maximize benefits.24 The Advisory Committee was tasked to keep in
mind the SEC's goals-investor protection, fair capital markets, and
capital formation-but with a particular focus on small businesses.2 s The
SEC required the Advisory Committee to define small businesses and to
provide "recommendations as to where and how the Commission should
draw lines to scale regulatory treatment for companies based on size."26
Of particular relevance to this Article's thesis is that the Advisory
Committee was advised to evaluate the effect of the financial regulatory
structure on both publicly-held and privately-held business, and the
Advisory Committee "[was] not limited to considering regulations
applicable to public companies."27 However, the SEC desired that the
Advisory Committee "would focus primarily on public companies,
because of the apparent need for prompt attention to that area of concern,
especially in view of problems in implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002."28 For smaller, privately-held businesses, the attention to their
needs, as exemplified by the Advisory Committee's report, likely is
welcome given the four-year delay between Sarbanes-Oxley's passage
and the Advisory Committee's report.29
The SEC has employed three approaches to lessen Sarbanes-
Oxley's impact on small businesses subject to SEC regulation: delayed
compliance dates, 'o recommending exemptions for certain businesses3'
and to a lesser extent, education.3 2 However, under these approaches, the
regulations have impacted small businesses outside of the SEC's
jurisdiction-the trickle down effect caused small businesses to change




27. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, pp. 1-2.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed on July 24, 2002. See 148 Cong. Rec.
H 5375, H 5393 (2002). The Advisory Committee Report was published on April 23,
2006. See supra note 14.
30. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports
of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
8731, 34-54942 (August 9, 2006) available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-
873 1.pdf.
31. Id. at 4-7.
32. See Comm. of Sponsoring Org. of the Treadway Comm'n., Internal Control over
Financial Reporting-Guidance for Smaller Public Companies (2006), available at
www.coso.org/documents/SB FAQs.pdf.
33. Paul D. Broude & Richard L. Prebil, Foley & Lardner, LLP, The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Private and Nonprofit Companies, Presented Before National
Directors Institute (March 10, 2005), available at http://www.directorsand
415
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executive compensation, and risk management provisions, this Article
explicates the potential impacts on both publicly traded and privately-
held small businesses. This Article suggests that small business owners
should be educated about the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
potential impacts and benefits. In particular, the SEC should lead the
charge to educate small business owners regarding corporate governance,
executive compensation and risk management impacts. Further, the SEC
should emphasize that the disclosure standards are devised to get
business to consider more carefully their corporate governance,
executive compensation and risk management practices. Moreover, the
SEC should emphasize that while the costs of regulation are easier to
quantify than the benefits, the benefits are real.
In determining whether the benefits of regulation outweigh the
costs, regulators should consider that business practices may change in
response to or even ahead of changes in the law. Regulators, including
the SEC and the Small Business Administration may consider providing
tax incentives or better loan terms to small businesses that implement
corporate governance, compensation and risk management practices.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section II describes Sarbanes-
Oxley's impact on both publicly-traded and privately-held small
businesses. This section details the consequences that arose from the
implementation of certain corporate governance provisions in Sarbanes-
Oxley. Section III uses the lessons learned from Sarbanes-Oxley's
implementation to make predictions about how the Dodd-Frank Act
reforms may impact both publicly-traded and privately-held businesses.
Section IV discusses ways in which positive outcomes may be obtained
for both publicly-traded and privately-held small businesses. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SMALL BUSINESSES AND SARBANES-OXLEY
Scholarship has documented the history of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's ("Sarbanes-Oxley") passage, the rationale behind its provisions
and the statute's costs for publicly-traded businesses-both large and
small.34 Prior to the act's passage, writers analyzed whether the statute
boards.com/ndi.pdf (citing research indicating that 87% of small business and non-profit
executives believe that Sarbanes-Oxley has impacted their businesses).
34. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1149 (2004); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Joseph A. Castelluccio III,
Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the Case for a Small
Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 429 (2005); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley,
Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State
Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 381 (2005); Tamar Frankel,
[Vol. 115:2416
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would correct the various causes of the financial and accounting scandals
in 2002." This scholarship focused on the roles and responsibilities of
the major players in the publicly-traded securities world-accounting
firms, ratings agencies, investment banking securities analysts, chief
executive and chief financial officers at publicly-traded firms, corporate
boards, independent board directors, board committees, self-regulatory
organizations, the SEC, state courts, and shareholders.36
The Sarbanes-Oxley scholarship principally addresses the
legislation's impact on publicly-held companies because Sarbanes-Oxley
explicitly regulates those companies.3 7 The scholarship focused much
less so on the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on privately-held companies
because the act did not explicitly apply to those companies.3 8 However,
a survey in 2005, three years after Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment,
indicated that Sarbanes-Oxley had a significant impact on privately-held
businesses.3 9  As one example, Sarbanes-Oxley's internal controls
mandates have created expectations that privately-held businesses will
implement new business practices with respect to internal controls, even
though Sarbanes-Oxley's internal control provisions do not apply to
private companies and implementing the provisions may prove costly.40
Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 Bus. LAW. 161
(2006); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Criticizing the Critics: Sarbanes-Oxley and Quack
Corporate Governance, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 309 (2006); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., The
Missing Link in Sarbanes-Oxtey: Enactment of the "Change of Control Board" Concept,
or Extension of the Audit Committee Provisions to Mergers and Acquisitions, 63 Bus.
LAW. 81 (2007); James Fanto, Corporate Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley:
Is there Real Change, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 517 (2007); Robert A. Britton, Note,
Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit Sector, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 437
(2008); Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 383 (2008); Peter V.
Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the United States:
The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 149
(2009); James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, The Effects and Unintended
Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22:8
REV. FIN. STUD. 3287 (2009); Joan T.A. Gabel, Nancy R. Mansfield, Paul Von Nessen,
Austin W. Hall & Andrew Jones, Evolving Regulation of Corporate Governance and the
Implications for D&O Liability: The United States and Australia, 11 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 365 (2010); Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate Governance in
Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257 (2010).
35. See e.g., Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and
Securities Law after Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002); Matthew J. Barrett, Sarbanes-
Oxley, Kermit the Frog, and Competition Regarding Audit Quality, 3 J.Bus. & TECH. L.
207 (2008)
36. Id.
37. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see
also Broude, supra note 33, at 2.
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A second example stems from accounting firm responsibilities under
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
("PCAOB") rules. 4 ' Accounting firms may apply a higher level of
scrutiny to closely-held businesses than in the past because accounting
firms desire to improve credibility and because regulators more closely
scrutinize audit firm practices.4 2 A third example concerns board
governance practices. Statutory and self-regulatory organization
requirements shaped publicly-held company governance norms. 43 These
business practices trickled down to closely-held companies, even though
closely-held firms may not have been in a position to implement all of
the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance mandates."
A. What is a Small Business Under Sarbanes-Oxley?
Many of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions impacting corporate
governance and corporate disclosure requirements were enacted as
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act").45 Under the Exchange Act regulations that require periodic
financial reporting for publicly-traded companies-that is, companies
whose shares are traded on an exchange or are held by a large number of
investors-a "small business" is defined as a corporation that:
has revenues of less than $25,000,000;
is a U.S. or Canadian issuer [of stock];
is not an investment company and is not an asset-backed issuer ... ;
and
41. Id; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
answers/pcaob.htm.
42. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 102-108, 116 Stat.
745, 753-768 (2002); see also Lessons Learned from Enron's Collapse: Auditing the
Accounting Industry: Hearing Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107"' Cong.
87 (2002) (statement of Bala G. Dharan, Professor, Rice University); Dorothy A.
Feldmann & William J. Read, Auditor Conservatism after Enron, 29 AUDING: J. PRAC.
& THEORY 267 (2010).
43. The American Stock Exchange, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the
New York Stock Exchange, and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation are
examples of financial industry self-regulatory organizations. See U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Other Links (2009), http://www.sec.gov/ links.shtml#selfreg (last
visited September 19, 2010).
44. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital
Markets Competitiveness Costs of SOX 404 Survey (2007), http://www.us
chamber.com/reports/cost-sox-404-survey (last visited October 10, 2010).
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(pp) (2010).
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if a majority owned subsidiary, the parent corporation is also a small
business issuer.
Provided however, that an entity is not a small business issuer if it
has a public float (the aggregate market value of the issuer's
outstanding voting and non-votin common equity held by non-
affiliates) of $25,000,000 or more.
Another category of small business is the "smaller reporting
company," defined as:
an issuer that is not an investment company, an asset-backed
issuer ... or a majority-owned subsidiary of a parent that is not a
smaller reporting company and that:
Had a public float of less than $75 million as of the last business day
of its most recently completed second fiscal quarter . . ; or
In the case of an initial registration statement under the Securities Act
or Exchange Act for shares of its common equity, had a public float
of less than $75 million as of a date within 30 days of the date of the
filing of the registration statement . . ; or
In the case of an issuer whose public float as calculated under [the
previous two] paragraph[s] of this definition was zero, had annual
revenues of less than $50 million during the most recently completed
fiscal year for which audited financial statements are available.
Determination: Whether or not an issuer is a smaller reporting
company is determined on an annual basis.47
For purpose of comparison, larger publicly-traded businesses fall
into two categories: accelerated filers and large accelerated filers.48 A
issuer is an accelerated filer if at the end of its fiscal year:
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)(2) (2009) [hereinafter Exchange Act Rule 12b-2] (The
definition is similar under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), which governs
the registration of securities and the disclosure of information for the purpose of selling
the securities to the public); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-78(pp) (2010). (Under the
Securities Act, a small business issuer is defined as: a United States or Canadian issuer
(1) that had less than $25 million in revenues in its last fiscal year, and (2) whose
outstanding publicly-held stock is worth no more than $25 million); see also U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Q&A: Small Business and the SEC (2009),
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited August 2, 2010).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(b)(2) (2009).
48. Id.
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The issuer had an aggregate worldwide market value of the voting
and non-voting common equity held by its non-affiliates of $75
million or more, but less than $700 million, as of the last business
day of the issuer's most recently completed second fiscal quarter;
The issuer has been subject to the [periodic financial reporting]
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Act for a period of at
least twelve calendar months;
The issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Act; and
The issuer is not eligible to use the requirements for smaller reporting
companies ... for its annual and quarterly reports.4 9
An issuer is a large accelerated filer if at the end of its fiscal year:
The issuer had an aggregate worldwide market value of the voting
and non-voting common equity held by its non-affiliates of $700
million or more, as of the last business day of the issuer's most
recently completed second fiscal quarter;
The issuer has been subject to the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Act for a period of at least twelve calendar months;
The issuer has filed at least one annual report pursuant to section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Act; and
The issuer is not eligible to use the requirements for smaller reporting
companies ... for its annual and quarterly reports.50
Initially, Sarbanes-Oxley applied by its express terms to all
publicly-traded businesses.5 1 However, Congress authorized the SEC to
exempt certain classes of issuers from Sarbanes-Oxley's mandates.52
Publicly-traded companies-large and small-and their service
providers, policy makers, investors, and scholars contested the
application of certain Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, and the exemption of
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Broude, supra note 33, at 2.
52. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports
of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, supra note 30, at 31
("Specifically, the Advisory Committee recommends that certain smaller public
companies be exempted from the management report requirement and from external
auditor involvement in the Section 404 process under certain circumstances. . . .").
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certain companies from those provisions. These debates are described
further below.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley's Section 404 and Privately-held Companies
Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 requires that senior executives assess
and attest to the effectiveness of financial reporting. Under a separate
Sarbanes-Oxley section, an auditor must make its own assessment of and
attest to the effectiveness of its corporate client's internal controls. 54
Further, an auditor must "evaluate the presentation of the elements that
management is required, under the SEC's rules, to present in its annual
report on internal control over financial reporting."55 Further, "[i]f the
auditor determines that the required disclosure about a material weakness
is not fairly presented in all material respects,"5 6 the auditor should
describe "the material weakness, which should provide the users of the
audit report with specific information about the nature of the material
weakness and its actual and potential effect on the presentation of the
company's financial statements issued during the existence of the
weakness" and report the auditor's conclusions to the board's audit
committee.
The PCAOB is authorized to work with audit and accounting
organizations to define standards for auditors to use in assessing and
attesting to internal controls. The SEC approved An Audit of Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an
Audit of the Financial Statements (Audit Standard No. 2, or "AS2"), an
audit standard developed by the PCAOB in conjunction with industry
groups. 59 The standard provided criteria for auditors to use when
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(a), 116 Stat. 745,
789 (2002).
54. See id.
55. Public Accounting Oversight Board, Auditing Standard No. 5: An Audit of
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an Audit of Financial
Statements, T 72, SEC Release No. 34-56152, (2007).
56. Id. at T C2.
57. Id.at 91.
58. See Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), SEC (CCH)
(2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/pcaob.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
59. See An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in
Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, SEC Release No. 34-49884, (June
17, 2004), superseded by Public Accounting Oversight Board, Auditing Standard No. 5:
An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with an Audit
of Financial Statements, SEC Release No. 34-56152, (July 27, 2007). Auditing Standard
No. 5 eliminated unnecessary audit procedures, focused the audit on items most
important to assessing internal control effectiveness, encouraged auditors to scale audits
to the complexity of the business audited, and simplified audit reporting requirements,
see Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board:
Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5: An Audit of Internal Control Over
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determining if internal controls are and management's assessment of
internal controls are fair and accurate. 0 However, the SEC indicated that
companies could perform their assessment of internal controls in
accordance with a recognized standard and suggested that the Committee
of Sponsoring Organizations ("COSO") framework would meet the
requirements as a recognized standard.6' The COSO framework
provides principles to guide and criteria to assess internal controls.62 It
does not provide guidance to management on how to document the
process used to test internal controls or how to correct deficiencies.
COSO published additional guidance in October 2005.6 However, the
additional guidance failed to meet many companies' expectations, as the
guidance did not necessarily decrease the implementation costs or
increase the perceived benefits of Section 404 compliance.
With the deadline for Section 404 looming, many companies turned
to AS2 for guidance on how to implement, test, assess and improve
internal controls even though AS2 laid out the criteria for auditors to
perform an assessment of internal controls and not for management to
implement effective internal controls.66 Audit costs and company
resources devoted to the financial audit increased as some companies
struggled to understand the new requirements, to assess internal controls
and to revise or to create new controls.67 Furthermore, many companies
decried the potential benefits of a new focus on effective internal
controls, especially in light of the costs of the reforms.6 8 In their view,
only a few companies had engaged in accounting fraud, yet all publicly
Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements, a Related
Independence Rule, and Conforming Amendments, 4-5, Rel. No. 34-56152 (2007).
60. Id. at 2.
61. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8238,
§ II.A.3.A. (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm.
62. See SOX-Online: The Vendor-Neutral Sarbanes-Oxley Site, The New Coso
Cube, 2006, available at http://www.sox-online.com/cosocobitcosocube-new.html.
6 3. Id.
64. See Grant Thornton, Tone at the Top: COSO Releases Guidance for Smaller
Public Companies in Complying with Section 404, 3 CoRP. GOVERNOR, No. 2 (2005).
65. See Grant Thornton, Tone From the Top: COSO Releases Guidance for Smaller
Public Companies in Complying with Section 404, 3 CoRP. GoVERNoR, No. 2 (2005).
66. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8238
supra note 59 at § II.
67. Id.
68. See Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley,
1-2 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbls3lPublications/File
Upload 137/3420/ndi%202006%20public%20study%2OFINAL.pdf.
422 [Vol. 115:2
2010] FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS
69
traded companies were made to suffer the consequences. Moreover,
the benefits of improved work processes related to gathering and
analyzing financial data were difficult for companies to quantify unless
those processes resulted in measurable outcomes, such as increased sales
prospects, or inventory efficiencies. Companies already had made the
cost-benefit decision to devote only so many resources to attempting to
improve those processes. The question for companies became why try to
improve processes that had worked satisfactorily and therefore were not
broken?
Accelerated filers and large accelerated filers were required to
comply with Section 404 by the end of the fiscal year on or after June 15,
2004.70 Small businesses and smaller reporting companies were
expected to comply by the end of the fiscal year on or after April 15,
2005.7n Due to the difficulties faced by companies in attempting to
comply with Section 404, the SEC extended the compliance dates to the
end of the fiscal year on or after November 15, 2004 for accelerated and
large accelerated filers. 2 The SEC gave further extensions to small
businesses and smaller reporting companies, pushing out the compliance
date to July 15, 2005,73 then to July 15, 2006,74 then to July 15, 2007,
then to December 15, 2007 for the management's report over internal
controls and June 15, 2010 for the auditor's attestation.76
69. See, e.g., Thomas E. Hartman, The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 4 (June 16, 2005), available at http://business.illinois.edulsandrett/Foley%20
Cost%20oP/o2OBeing%2OPublic.pdf.
70. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8238,
supra note 59, § II.
71. Id. at § VII.
72. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8392
§ Dates, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8392.htm.
73. Id.
74. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers
and Foreign Private Issuers, SEC Release No. 33-8545, available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/33-8545.pdf.
75. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Companies that are Not
Accelerated Filers, SEC Release No. 33-8618, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8618.pdf.
76. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports
of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, SEC Release No. 33-8760
§ Summary, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8760.pdf.
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At a practical level, section 404 implementation costs are higher
than the costs to implement other sections of Sarbanes-Oxley.n Section
404 implementation costs include "direct costs such as employee and
consultant time, expenditures for new technology, and increased auditor
fees for internal control testing."78 Less obvious, indirect costs include
"reassigning people and resources away from other, business-specific
roles" to focus on the internal control audit and attestation. 79 These costs
may be disproportionately burdensome for small businesses and smaller
reporting companies. For example, in April 2006, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) released a report analyzing Sarbanes-
Oxley's impact on smaller businesses.80  The GAO reported that "the
cost of compliance has been disproportionately higher" for smaller
publicly-traded companies, "particularly with respect to the internal
control reporting provisions in Section 404 and related audit fees."
Smaller companies faced disproportionately higher indirect costs, such as
the cost of using resources for compliance activities as opposed to other
business activities. 82 Interestingly, the report notes
[t]his situation was also impacted by the fact that many companies
documented their internal control for the first time and needed to
make significant improvements to their internal control as part of
their first year of implementing section 404, despite the fact that most
have been required by law since 1977 to have implemented a system
of internal accounting controls.83
Also, section 404 has proved to be the most difficult for companies
to implement. Not only do many studies indicate that Section 404 is the
77. Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section




80. See GAO-06-361, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE GoVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO),
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING
IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d0636 I.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
81. Id. at Highlights.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id.
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most costly Sarbanes-Oxley provision,84 but section 404 may be the most
burdensome in terms of corporate compliance.85
By granting extensions for small businesses and smaller reporting
companies, the SEC recognized that Section 404's "real-world" costs
may outweigh the benefits to small businesses and smaller reporting
companies.8 6 As discussed further in Section III.A.6 of this article,
Section 989G of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly exempts small businesses
and smaller reporting companies from the auditor attestation of internal
controls over financial reporting.8 7  However, small, publicly-traded
businesses may choose to assess and attest to internal controls for the
same reasons that smaller, privately-held businesses may follow section
404's mandates.
Smaller, privately-held businesses are not required to assess the
effectiveness of internal controls under Sarbanes-Oxley.88 Also, the
chief executives of smaller companies are not required to attest to the
effectiveness of internal controls, nor are they subject to Sarbanes-
Oxley's enhanced penalty provisions for failure to attest or for
restatements of their companies' financial data.89  However, privately-
held businesses have been impacted by Section 404's requirements.
First, a publicly-held company that acquires a privately-held target
company must integrate the target company's financial statements into
the public company's consolidated financial statements and attest to the
84. See Ken Small et al., Size Does Matter: An Examination of the Economic Impact
of Sarbanes-Oxley, ENTREPRENEUR, 2007, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/
tradejournals/article/1 65359569 1 .html (discussing the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance, the difficulties of measuring the costs and benefits, and reporting the results
of an empirical study of the costs of compliance in different-sized companies).
85. See Stephen Wagner and Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits of Sarbanes-
Oxley, HARV. Bus. REv., Apr. 2006, at 2-3 (asserting that compliance with section 404
strengthens the control environment).
86. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Comm'n, SEC Begins Small Business
Costs and Benefits Study of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-8.htm.
87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 989G, 124 Stat. 1376:
Sec. 989G. Exemption for Nonaccelerated Filers.
(a) Exemption.-Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is
amended by adding at the end the following:
"(c) Exemption for Smaller Issuers.-Subsection (b) shall not apply with
respect to any audit report prepared for an issuer that is neither a 'large
accelerated filer' nor an 'accelerated filer' as those terms are defined in
Rule 12b-2 of the Commission (17 C.F.R. 240.12b-2)."
88. See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No.
33-8238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47986, Sec. II 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 at 36,638
(Jun. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm.
89. See id
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effectiveness of the target company's internal controls.90 As noted, the
cost of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 may be
significant. 91 An acquirer may be willing to acquire a company that has
not attempted to understand and follow COSO principles, but only at a
reduced acquisition price.92 Alternatively, an acquirer may be unwilling
to purchase a company that has not assessed its internal controls.93 As a
result, even relatively small companies are paying attention to Sarbanes-
Oxley Section 404, although these companies weigh the costs of
implementing internal control audits versus the likelihood of a payoff in
terms of enhancing company value as an acquisition target.94
Second, although many privately-held businesses are focused on the
exigencies of staying in business, particularly during these tough
economic times, other privately-held businesses see value in paying
attention to internal controls. 95  These businesses see a competitive
advantage in having better control over workflow and processes that
90. Id.
91. See Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404
and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 429, 458 (2005); see
also Committee of Sponsoring Organizations, Internal Control over Financial
Reporting-Guidance for Smaller Public Companies (June 2006), available at
www.coso.org/documents/SB FAQs.pdf.
92. See William Gienke, Small Companies Also Can Benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley,
BIzTIMES.COM, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.biztimes.com/news/2008/2/22/small-
companies-also-can-benefit-from-sarbanes-oxley (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). Gienke
recommends that:
[p]rivately held companies considering a buyout by a publicly held company
should consider how efficient their internal controls are before an opportunity
arises. Strong internal controls ensure the privately held company does not
create a material weakness for the public buyer, which could become a barrier
to completing a transaction. Strong internal controls also add confidence to the
acquiring company during the courting process.
Id.
Sarbames-Oxley compliance may also benefit companies seeking an initial public
offering. According to the GAO Report:
[w]hile [Sarbanes-Oxley] does not impose new requirements on privately held
companies, companies choosing to go public must realistically spend time and
funds in order to demonstrate their ability to comply with the act, section 404 in
particular, to attract investors who will seek the assurances and protections that
compliance with section 404 provides.
GAO Report, at 7.
93. See Gienke, supra note 89.
94. See Internal Control over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports
of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8731, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54295, 71 Fed. Reg. 47,060 (proposed Aug. 15,
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/ 33-8731 .pdf.
95. Fifty percent of privately heldstart-ups fail in the first five years. Also, only
thirty percent of privately held business have a succession plan or engage in long range
planning, despite evidence that succession and long range planning are integral to the
viability of privately held businesses.
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result in accounting ledger inputs or financial statement notes.96 The
attention to internal controls has produced a wealth of data that may be
helpful to these businesses.97 In fact, these companies are able to adopt
Sarbanes-Oxley transparency, accountability and responsibility
principles that fit the size of their enterprises but need not adopt all of the
provisions and need not pay the costs of full compliance. Moreover,
these companies are not subject to penalties for non-compliance and thus
do not bear the risk of litigation for failure to comply with the act9 8
Therefore, COSO principles and internal control audits have taken hold
as these companies increasingly adopt internal control assessment criteria
and strategies to address deficiencies in internal controls. As this article
discusses in Section IV, the SEC should be instrumental in encouraging
small business owners to adopt reforms that result in value for the
business.99
C. Changes in Accounting Firm Practices
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that public accounting firms register with
the PCAOB; the PCAOB would monitor firms, perform assessments of
firms, and set guidelines and standards for the conduct of audit
business.100 In addition to internal controls assessment and attestation
per PCAOB-sanctioned standards, Sarbanes-Oxley required that firms
performing audits
report to the audit committee of the issuer-
(1) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
(2) all alternative treatments of financial information within
generally accepted accounting principles that have been
discussed with management officials of the issuer, ramifications
of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the
96. See Internal Control over Financial Reporting-Guidance for Smaller Public
Companies, supra note 88.
97. See id.
98. Companies that are not required to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions
would not be liable under Sarbanes-Oxley for failure to comply with the act's provisions.
However, to the extent that Sarbanes-Oxley may establish governance norms, failure to
comply with those norms may give rise to a cause of action under state law. See,
generally, Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care
and the Standard ofLiability Post-Enron, 6 Wyo. L. REv. 481 (2006).
99. See William Gienke, Small Companies Also Can Benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley,
BIzTIMES.COM, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.biztimes.com/news/2008/2/22/small-
companies-also-can-benefit-from-sarbanes-oxley (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2006).
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treatment preferred by the registered public accounting firm;
and
(3) other material written communications between the
registered public accounting firm and the management of the
issuer, such as any management letter or schedule of unadjusted
differences.10
Such policies, practices, treatments of financial information and material
written communications may include criteria for determining the
effectiveness of internal controls. 1 02
Legislators anticipated that the auditors' assessment of internal
controls would be included in the engagement to assess a company's
financial reporting. In fact, the Senate Committee Report noted that
"high quality audits typically incorporate extensive internal control
testing." 0 3 And AS2 provided guidance on what a high quality audit
would entail. Legislators expected that auditors would improve audit
quality for all companies subject to the statute.
Legislators and businesses anticipated that audit costs would rise as
a result of the internal controls requirements.'0 However, audit costs
rose more than anticipated. 0 5 Perhaps in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
as audit companies faced increasing pressure from clients to minimize
audit fees, and audit partners faced pressure to generate consulting
business, auditors minimized audit fees in the expectation that a satisfied
audit client would be more willing to pay higher consulting fees. This
may have produced some sacrifices in terms of audit quality-a
deterioration in the level of scrutiny of the financial statements' accuracy
and fairness, and in the auditor's assessment of the quality of the
processes that needed to be in place to ensure that the financial
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 204, 116 Stat. 745, 773 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78
(j-1)). Critical accounting policies includes how certain transactions are accounted for
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that provide accounting alternatives. A
management letter is written by the auditor, accompanies the audit, and contains
conclusions about the internal controls, treatments of financial information and the audit
itself.
102. See Order Approving Proposed Audit Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal
Control over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated With an Audit of Financial
Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56152, 72 Fed. Reg. 42141 (July 27, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2007/34-56152.pdf.
103. Sarbanes-Oxley Committee Report, S. REP. No. 107-205, at 31 (2002).
104. See Sarbanes Oxley Drives Up Large Companies' Audit Costs by $1.4 Billion,
INs. J., Apr. 28, 2005, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/04/
28/54393.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); see also Susan W. Eldrige and Burch T.
Kealey, SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation under Section 404 (Working Paper Series, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=743285.
105. See Sarbanes Oxley Drives, supra note 104.
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statements fairly and accurately reported the financial conditions of
corporations.
Legislators did not anticipate that audit companies would tend to
take a uniform approach under AS2.'06 Furthermore, auditors focused on
testing processes that are concretized in information technology.10 7 As a
result, some auditors tested computer systems that had little to no impact
on financial statement integrity os The implication for privately-held
businesses is two-fold. First, auditors' tendency to take a uniform
approach during public company audits may carry over to audits of
privately-held businesses. Privately-held businesses may have fewer and
less complex computer system-based financial information controls and
processes than exist at publicly-held businesses. Prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley, auditors may have tailored their audits to account for the relative
simplicity of privately-held businesses' financial information systems
and processes. However, after Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors may scrutinize
processes and technology more closely at privately-held businesses than
before Sarbanes-Oxley. The internal controls assessment and the
attestation may seem to go beyond that warranted by the size of the
business. Thus it may appear that the internal controls audit's cost far
outweighs any benefit. On the other hand, prior to Sarbanes-Oxley it
appears that too little was done with respect to internal controls at both
publicly-held and privately-held businesses.1 09 Second, small business
owners may respond to the anxiety produced by too little guidance for
small businesses with respect to internal control audits by purchasing and
implementing new computer technologies without much guidance or
knowledge of the expected benefit, thus defeating the purpose of picking
and choosing from Sarbanes-Oxley best practices.
A potentially less costly accounting firm best practice is the
requirement that the outside auditors report to the board of directors'
audit committee.110  Small businesses may reap benefits from this
106. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, at 28-32; see also Internal
Control over Financial Reporting-Guidance for Smaller Public Companies, supra note
88.
107. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, at 32.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 25-28 (explaining why Section 404 was originally implemented and
the original result it hoped to achieve).
110. Privately held companies increasingly are using outside directors and
independent audit committees. A 2003 Financial Executives Research Foundation, Inc.
question posed to a listserv generated a consensus that "today's private companies are
adding outside directors to their boards, and some are even establishing audit
committees." William M. Sinnett, Even Private Company Boards of Directors are
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corporate governance practice, assuming that an audit committee exists.
As discussed in Section IV, the SEC should work with the Small
Business Administration and accounting firm industry groups
representing smaller accounting firms to better understand best practices
in internal financial controls for small businesses and to provide benefits
for early adopters of the best practices.
D. Changes in Corporate Governance Practices
A number of corporate governance mandates in Sarbanes-Oxley
were best practices at public corporations prior to Sarbanes-Oxley's
enactment.' 11  The regulation's critics challenged the wisdom of
mandating corporate governance structures for several reasons. 1 2 First,
critics pointed out the "one-size fits all" nature of the requirements and
suggested that the provisions should be opt-in or voluntary.1 3 Also,
critics highlighted the fact that many companies had adopted these
requirements prior to the accounting scandals and the scandals still
occurred. 1 4  Further, empirical studies sought to determine whether
companies with such corporate governance provisions in place had better
shareholder value, better board governance, or better corporate
governance. 115  Although empirical research conclusions are still
evolving, to date the evidence is inconclusive.' 16
Nonetheless, a 2005 survey of private business and non-profit
executives found that 87% of respondents believed that Sarbanes-Oxley
and the subsequent corporate governance reforms had impacted their
businesses.l 17 Also, the survey's respondents "generally believe in the
principles guiding corporate governance regulation and in many areas are
increasingly adopting corporate governance reforms as best practices.
The respondents had implemented relatively inexpensive reforms,
including "CEO/CFO financial statement certification, appointment of
11l. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 165, 952, 957,
971, 972, 116 Stat. 745 (These sections reflect the changes that were required in terms of
corporate governance.).
112. See Fanto, supra note 34; Thompson, supra note 34; Linck, Netter & Yang,
supra note 34.
113. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 14, at 40-42.
114. See id.
115. See Romano, supra note 34; Frankel, supra note 34; Fanto, supra note 34; see
also Paul D. Broude & Richard L. Prebil, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Private and
Nonprofit Companies, NAT'L DIRECTORS INST. (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chicago, Ill.),
Mar. 10, 2005, 2, available at http://www.directorsandboards.com/ndi.pdf.
116. Id.
117. See Paul D. Broude and Richard L. Prebil, Foley & Lardner LLP, The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Private and Nonprofit Companies, 2, 2005, National Directors
Institute Executive Summary, available at http://www.directorsandboards.com/ ndi.pdf
118. Id. at 2.
430 [Vol. 115:2
2010] FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS
independent directors, adopting a corporate ethical code, establishing
whistle blower procedures, and approval of non-audit services by the
board."' 19 Implementing these requirements may be less costly than
implementing internal control audits. Further, the downside risk is
limited.120
The topic of small business adoption of these Sarbanes-Oxley
provisions appears to have reached the mainstream. Even Microsoft
recommends that small businesses adopt four Sarbanes-Oxley principles:
(1) have more than one accounting firm-do not have the same
accounting firm do audits and provide consulting staff; (2) have an
audit committee that oversees "some system of internal checks and
balances that includes interactions with management"; (3) institute
whistleblower protections; and (4) make your board of advisors truly
independent.12
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND SMALL BUSINESSES
The late spring of 2007 and the fall of 2008 witnessed a period of
worldwide bank collapse, extreme volatility in the global financial
markets, the bursting of the United States housing bubble, rapidly
enacted and then abandoned regulatory solutions by state governments,
international credit freezes, burgeoning unemployment, government bank
takeovers and investments in formerly venerable Wall Street investment
banks, below zero interest rates, a universal decline in stock market
averages and billions in economic stimulus and bailouts. The term the
"Great Recession" aptly defines this period in economic history.
According to some, the Great Recession ended in mid-September
2008,122 to others in mid-2009. Some opine that early 2010 saw the
beginning of a sluggish economic recovery. However, others fear that
the deep recession continues, especially for individuals who saw their
standard of living decline over the last two decades.
Despite the troubling economic news and uncertainty about the
source or the length of the recovery, new business startups have
increased, especially among workers age 55 and older.123 At first glance,
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id.
121. See Small Business Legal Advice, Microsoft Small Business,
http://www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/resources/fmance/small-business-legal.
aspx#PrivatecompanieslessonsfromSarbanesOxleyAct.
122. See Stephen C. Fehr, The Great Recession: What's in a name?,
NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM, April 2, 2010, http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/
nation/the-great-recession-whats-in-a-name (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
123. See Steven Greenhouse, Starting Over at 55, N.Y TIMES, March 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/business/retirementspecial/04WORK.html ("More
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this phenomenon may seem counterintuitive. However, some of these
individuals lost their jobs in the Great Recession and have joined the
ranks of the self-employed in order to "make ends meet."l 24  These
individuals have the skills and contacts necessary to find clients or make
connections to sell goods. Other individuals lost retirement income in
the economic downturn and are no longer able to remain retired.
Moreover, demographics factor into the increase in the number of 55 and
older entrepreneurs. "The 55-and-overs are playing a larger role in
entrepreneurship partly because the number of Americans in that age
category is rising rapidly."l 25
A. The Dodd-Frank Act Reforms
Ongoing Congressional hearings attempted to pinpoint the many
factors that caused the Great Recession and to inform the debate leading
to the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment.12 6 The bursting of the debt-financed
housing bubble, and "a breakdown in our financial system"l27 were the
most visible causes. 128 In his speech upon signing the Dodd-Frank Act,
President Obama stated, "[I]t was a crisis born of a failure of
responsibility from certain corners of Wall Street to the halls of power in
Washington."l 2 9 The financial system rules were "antiquated and poorly
enforced .. . and allowed some to game the system and take risks that
endangered the entire economy."o30 In addition, "unscrupulous lenders
locked consumers into complex loans with hidden costs."' 3' President
than five million Americans age 55 or older run their own businesses or are otherwise
self-employed. . . . And the number of self-employed people ages 55-64 is soaring, the
agency says, climbing 52 percent from 2000 to 2007.") (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010).
127. See Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (July 21,
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act).
128. See Congressional Debate, Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009 H.R. 4173, 11 ' Con r. (2009); US Senate's Restoring American Financial Stability
Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111 Congr. (2009) (during the bill reconciliation process centered
on predatory consumer lending practices, particularly in the mortgage industry, and on
financial institution business practices).
129. See Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (July 21,
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Obama emphasized consumer protection, financial markets stability, and
investor empowerment.132
The Dodd-Frank Act has several highlights that address these
concerns. First, the Dodd-Frank Act includes consumer protections with
respect to credit card and checking account fee abuses, mortgage
industry predatory lending, student loans, and mutual fund information
access. 3 3  The consumer protections include the establishment of a
consumer protection watchdog to enforce the rules. 134 Second, the Dodd-
Frank Act includes provisions purportedly designed to limit banks'
ability to engage in risky derivatives trading (e.g., credit default swaps)
and to bring more transparency to derivatives trading.13 5  Under the
Federal Reserve Board's new powers, major financial institutions may be
ordered to divest businesses in order to avoid becoming too big to fail.136
The Federal Depository Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve
Board have express authority to "insure that the failure of a major
financial firm does not lead to chain-reaction failures through losses to
unsecured creditors." 3 7
The investor empowerment provisions seek to strengthen
shareholder voice with respect to director nominations, executive
compensation and other corporate internal affairs.138 These provisions,
and the risk management provisions that apply to large financial
institutions but that may impact smaller, non-financial businesses, are
analyzed below.
1. Shareholder Democracy Reforms
Section 971 deals with proxy access for shareholders-an issue on
which "progress . . . has been glacial at best."' 39 Under this section, the
SEC may promulgate rules requiring that companies' proxy solicitations
"include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of
132. Id.
133. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. §§ 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078 (2010).
134. Id. at § 1011; see also id. at §§ 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028,
1029 (2010) (explaining the powers and responsibilities of the bureau as established in
the act).
135. Id. at Title VII.
136. Id. § 121 (2010).
137. Id. at § 165.
138 Posting of Steven Ramirez to Corporate Justice Blog, Dodd-Frank IV: A
Revolution in Corporate Governance?, July 25, 2010 http://corporatejustice
blog.blogspot.com/2010/07/dodd-frank-iv-revolution-in-corporate.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2011).
139. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 971 (2010); see Ramirez, supra note 138.
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directors. . . ." The SEC may exempt issuers from proxy access
requirements "tak[ing] into account, among other considerations,
whether the requirement . .. disproportionately burdens small issuers."l 4 0
SEC rulemaking on proxy access has been in the works for some time,
and the SEC has taken a fairly aggressive stance. In a blog post
analyzing the Dodd-Frank major corporate governance provisions,
Professor Steven Ramirez opined, "perhaps [section 971] can operate to
break the logjam." 4 1
Section 957 abolishes the "broker may vote" rule. This rule allows
broker discretionary voting on uncontested matters, including
uncontested director elections, if the beneficial owner of the shares has
not provided voting instructions by a certain date before a scheduled
meeting.14 2  According to the Council for Institutional Investors,
discretionary voting in uncontested director elections "skews voting
results.... Approximately 85 percent of all shares in U.S. public
companies are held in 'street name,' meaning they are held of record in
bank or brokerage accounts for the ultimate beneficiary owners." 4 3
Also, "about 20 percent of 'street name' shares are voted by brokers
without instruction."'" Thus, the "broker may vote" rule was "akin to
stuffing the ballot box for management as broker votes almost always are
cast in favor of management's proposals and candidates for board
seats." 45
On July 1, 2009, the SEC approved a New York Stock Exchange
rule proposal to essentially prohibit brokers from voting uninstructed
proxies in uncontested director elections.14 6 The Dodd-Frank Act section
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 971 (2010).
141. See id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 138.
142. See Voting Procedure Without Instructions, New York Stock Exchange Rule
452, (available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?
SelectedNode=chpl 2&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/) (Rule 452 provides that a
member organization may give a proxy to vote stock provided that: ... it has not received
voting instructions from the beneficial owner or from the beneficial owner's designated
investment adviser, by the date. specified in the statement accompanying such
material.. ).
143. See Council of Institutional Investors, Broker Voting (2008),




146. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as modified by Amendment No. 4,
to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Corresponding Listed Company Manual Section 402.08
to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, Except for
Companies Registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and to Codify Two
Previously Published Interpretations that Do Not Permit Broker Discretionary Voting for
Material Amendments to Investment Advisory Contracts with an Investment Company,
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957 takes the prohibition on broker discretionary voting at least one step
further. Section 957 prohibits a broker from voting proxies in director
elections, on executive compensation and other "significant matters,"
unless the broker has received instructions from the beneficial owner of
the shares.14 7 The Dodd-Frank Act Section 957, especially coupled with
activist shareholder "withhold the vote" campaigns, has the potential to
change the outcome of director elections.14 8 Further it has the potential
to tip shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation and on
"other significant matters" related to investor voice. The SEC has
authority to define "other significant matters" through rulemaking;149 and
thus has the authority to effect other changes empowering investors.150
2. Say-on-Pay, Say-on-Golden-Parachutes, Pay versus
Performance Disclosure, and Clawbacks
Section 951 includes the "say on pay" provision giving shareholders
a non-binding vote on executive compensation.' 5' Also, section 951
requires companies to disclose "golden parachute" payments that would
be awarded on completion of a merger, acquisition or sale, and provides
Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215, (July 1, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf.
147. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 § 957 (2010).
148. See Broker Voting, supra note 146. According to the Council of Institutional
Investors:
In 2009, many observers believed that excluding uninstructed broker votes
might have tipped the outcome in director elections at Bank of America and
Citigroup, resulting in one or more directors at each company not being re-
elected....
In 2008, activist shareowners pointed to the April 15 board elections at
Washington Mutual as a textbook case for the way broker votes can taint
elections. One director resigned after Washington Mutual reported that
shareowners had withheld 49.9 percent of votes for her. Some Washington
Mutual shareowners, however, suspect that one or more directors running for
re-election would not have received majority support if uninstructed brokers
had been excluded from the tally. CTW Investment Group, which had led a
withhold campaign against two Washington Mutual directors because of risk
management and executive compensation concerns, called on the board to
demand the resignation of any directors who failed to win majority votes. The
Council sent a letter to Washington Mutual asking the board to clarify the
preliminary vote totals for the director elections by promptly disclosing the
results excluding uninstructed broker votes.
149. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 § 957 (2010).
150. See Ramirez, supra note 138.
151. Id.
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for a non-binding shareholder vote on the golden parachute payments.152
The purpose of these provisions is to "give shareholders a powerful
opportunity to hold accountable executives of the companies they own,
and a chance to disapprove where they see the kind of misguided
incentive schemes that threatened individual companies and in turn the
broader economy."' 5 3 The rule takes effect in January of 2011, and the
SEC has authority to promulgate rules to exempt issuers from the say-on-
pay and golden parachute requirements.15 4  Specifically, "[i]n
determining whether to make an exemption ... the Commission shall
take into account, among other considerations, whether the [say-on-pay
and say-on-golden parachutes] requirements . .. disproportionately
burdens small issuers."' 5 5
The say-on-pay and say-on-golden-parachutes provisions suffer
somewhat from the fact that the shareholders' vote is not binding on
corporate boards156 . Nonetheless, the regulation has value if it results in
more scrutiny-and correction-of executive compensation practices
that are entrenched in corporate culture and have proven detrimental to
global economic health.
Section 953 directs the SEC to promulgate disclosure rules to create
more transparency regarding senior corporate officers' pay versus
corporate performance.157 Companies must disclose in proxy statements
and consent solicitations "clear descriptions" of financial information,
including "information that shows the relationship between executive
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer,
taking into account any change in the value of the shares of stock and
dividends .. . and distributions."' 58
Finally, section 954 requires the SEC to promulgate rules requiring
companies to implement clawback policies. The clawback policy (1)
would require disclosure of the incentive-based compensation policy and
(2) in the event of a financial restatement due to "material
152. Id A golden parachute is a clause in an executive's contract specifying that
he/she will receive large benefits in the event that the company is acquired and the
executive employment is terminated.
153. See Sen. Christopher Dodd, Summary: Restoring American Financial Stability:
Create a Sound Economic Foundation to Grow Jobs, Protect Consumers, Rein in Wall
Street, End Too Big to Fail, Prevent Another Financial Crisis, Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, (2009), available at http://banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/FinancialReformSummaryAsFiled.pdf
154. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 § 951 (2010).
155. See id.
156. See id.; Dodd, supra note 153.
157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 § 953 (2010).
158. Id.
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noncompliance of the issuer with any financial reporting requirement
under the securities law," require the issuer to:
recover from any current or former executive officer of the issuer
who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options
awarded as compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the
date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would
have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting
restatement.
The executive compensation clawback provision may not dissuade
executives from taking excessive risks that were not well understood and
then failing to disclose the stark reality that the risks were not well
understood. Even if the executive's compensation is subject to
clawback, the executive only loses compensation over the amount that
otherwise would have been earned (there is no penalty for the executive)
and the damage already has been done.
3. Compensation Committees
Reminiscent of Sarbanes-Oxley's audit committee independence
rules, Section 952 essentially requires the SEC to promulgate rules
requiring that listed companies (i.e., companies traded on a national
stock exchange) have an independent compensation committee and
requires the SEC to define independence.' 60 Also, when choosing a
"compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other advisers to the
compensation committee," the compensation committee must consider
whether the adviser is independent.' 6' In addition, reminiscent of
Sarbanes-Oxley's mandate regarding the relationship between the audit
committee and the auditor, section 252 gives the compensation
committee the authority to hire, "in its sole discretion," compensation
committee advisers, and mandates that the compensation committee is
"directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight
of the work of "the advisers." 62 Further, companies must disclose in
proxy statements or in solicitations for shareholder consent whether the
compensation committee sought and received advice from compensation
advisers, and whether any conflicts of interest existed on the part of the
advisers.'6 3 Finally, section 952 authorizes the SEC to allow the national
159. See id. at § 954.
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exchanges to consider the rule's costs versus the benefits for smaller
issuers and to devise exemptions if appropriate. 64
Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley's audit committee independence
requirement questioned the requirements on a number of fronts. For
example, many public corporations-including those corporations that
had engaged in accounting fraud-already had independent audit
committees and board members with accounting expertise; yet, the
accounting frauds still occurred. 16 5 Another criticism is there should not
be so much focus on requiring independence of audit committees, but
rather the focus should be on ensuring experts are on the committee.166
Many studies have shown that the presence of experts has led to positive
earnings for a company, whereas no positive impact occurred when the
committee simply was made up of independent individuals.66 Finally,
there has been some criticism about whether companies should actually
have confidence in the work of these independent committees.168 One
commentator discussed the reliability of these committees by explaining
that they have much less experience with and understanding of the
businesses with which they work, which in turn could lead to business
decisions that are not necessarily beneficial.16 9
Similar critiques might develop with respect to the independent
compensation committee provision. For example, the New York Stock
Exchange Listing Rules already require that compensation committees
are composed entirely of independent directors.170 Both before, during
and after the Wall Street meltdown, independent compensation
committees awarded large bonuses. Therefore, independent
compensation committees may not be the answer to what is seen among
law academics, economists and the general population as compensation
greed and excess.
Indeed, under this analysis, neither the independent compensation
committee provision nor the executive compensation clawback provision
discussed above goes far enough towards effecting real change in
164. Id.
165. See Romano, supra note 34.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN AND HENRY N. BUTLER, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE:
WHAT WE'vE LEARNED; How To Fix IT, AEI Press (2006).
169. Id.
170. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL: LISTING REQUIREMENTs, SECTION
303A.01: INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, available at http://www.nysemanual.com/1cm.
171. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress
Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2009); see also Ian Katz, Feinberg Says
Companies Should Adjust Pay Policies for "Crisis," BLOOMBERG, July 23, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-22/feinberg-said-to-cite- 17-u-s-bail-out-
recipients-for-unwarranted-payments.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
438 [Vol. 115:2
2010] FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS
executive compensation practices and in business practices. However,
the provisions are a sign of some progress in curbing excessive
compensation. Finally Congress has waded into an area it was hesitant
to enter in 2002 with Sarbanes-Oxley. Independent compensation
committees, coupled with increased compensation disclosures, separating
the CEO and board chair roles, heightened investor awareness and media
exposure related to compensation practices and Congressional
willingness to legislate in this area may result in a more conservative
approach to executive compensation.
4. Separating the CEO and Board Chair Roles
Section 972 follows the Sarbanes-Oxley mechanism requiring
disclosure on corporate governance issues as a way to effectuate certain
business norms.17 2 Section 972 requires companies to disclose whether
the chief executive officer and board chair roles are held by the same or
by different individuals, and to disclose the reasons for implementing a
particular governance structure.
5. Risk Management
Although the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act section 165 is "to
prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States that
could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing
activities, of large, interconnected financial institutions," risk
management lessons may be implemented on a smaller scale.17 3 Under
the Dodd-Frank Act section 165(h), nonbank financial companies
supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors ("Board of
Governors"), publicly-traded bank holding companies with assets greater
than $10 billion must establish a risk committee.174  The Board of
Governors may require publicly-traded bank holding companies with
assets less than $10 billion to establish a risk committee.'7 5  The risk
committee must be independent and must have at least one risk expert.176
172. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat.
745, 790 (2002) (requiring disclosure of the number of financial experts serving on a
company's audit committee); see also id. at § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002) (requiring
disclosure of whether the company has a code of ethics covering principal executive
officers and chief financial officers).
173. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
11-203, § 165(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (2010).
174. See id. at § 165(h)(2)(A).
175. Id. at § 165(h)(2)(B).
176. Id. at § 165(h)(3)(B)-(C).
439
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
The committee would be responsible for oversight of the company's
"enterprise-wide risk management practices." 17
6. Sarbanes-Oxley § 404 Exemption for Smaller Issuers
The Dodd-Frank Act section 989G makes permanent for smaller
reporting companies (publicly-traded companies with a market
capitalization under $75 million) an exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley
section 404(b)'s auditor attestation requirement.' 78  Also, the SEC is
directed to research ways to reduce compliance costs for accelerated
filers while maintaining investor protections and promoting initial public
offerings on United States stock exchanges.179  Further Dodd-Frank
section 9891 directs the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") to
study the impact of the exemption on investor confidence, capital costs,
and the number of restatements for smaller companies versus larger
companies required to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley section 404.180 Last,
the GAO is required to analyze whether companies should disclose the
lack of attestation and the costs and benefits of the attestation to smaller
companies that voluntarily comply.' 8 ' Not surprisingly, smaller
businesses have welcomed the current and prospective relief from
mandatory compliance costs, especially in the current, weak economy.18 2
A full critique of the provisions mentioned should involve analysis
from a number of disciplines, including law, economics and cognitive
sciences. Thus, a full critique of whether or not the provisions would
"restore responsibility and accountability in our financial system" is
beyond the scope of this Article.' 83  Also, many of the provisions
discussed above require that the SEC "undertake various initiatives,
including rulemaking and studies touching on many areas of financial
regulation." 84 The final rules and standards may be flexible enough to
soften reforms that otherwise may be unpalatable. For example, Dodd-
Frank section 952 directs the SEC to exempt small businesses if the
177. Id. at 203 § 165(h)(3)(A).
178. Id. at § 989G(a).
179. Id. at §989G(b).
180. Id. at §9891.
181. See U.S. GovERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Consideration of Key Principles Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller
Public Companies, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-361 (last
visited Aug. 14, 2010).
182. Seeid
183. See Dodd, supra note 153.
184. See UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Public Comments
on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the Dodd-Frank Act, (Oct. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml.
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compliance costs would outweigh the benefits'1' As another example,
Dodd-Frank's proxy access rule is delayed for three years for smaller
business.186 However, regardless of Dodd-Frank's ultimate value, smaller
businesses likely have begun to consider how the Dodd-Frank Act will
impact them.
B. The Implications for Privately Held Businesses
The impact on small, privately-held businesses turns on the purpose
of the particular regulation, the principles underlying the regulation, and
the costs versus the benefits of adopting potentially new norms.
1. Permanent Exemption from Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act's passage, small businesses were likely
to adopt the less costly Sarbanes-Oxley reforms-compensation
committees, risk management committees-and forego the more costly
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 attestation requirement.
However, small businesses recognized reasons to implement best
practice internal controls and to seek auditor attestation. First, smaller
businesses generally have weaker internal financial controls than
publicly-traded companies.187  This is not surprising given that small,
privately-held businesses are not required to produce the extensive and
detailed financial reports that must be produced by publicly-traded
companies. Therefore, most privately-held businesses have little
incentive to create information systems that would make producing such
reports more efficient. Also, whereas most publicly-traded company
owners (i.e., shareholders) are not involved in the day-to-day operations
of companies, most small business owners are involved personally
responsible for (1) attracting and retaining customers, (2) growing
revenue, and (3) reducing taxes. Such responsibilities leave little time
for administrative attention to business planning and processes.
However, weak internal financial controls expose a business to risk,
185. See generally TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER & KAREN G. MILLS, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: SMALL BusINEss FINANCING FORUM 18, 4-5 (2009), available at
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba-homepage/smallbussfinan
forum report.pdf.
186. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, Release 33-9136 § "Compliance Dates," available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf.
187. See Jean C. Bedard, Lynford E. Graham, Rani Hoitash, and Udi Hoitash,
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 and Internal Controls: A Look at Two Years of Compliance,
The CPA Journal Online, Oct. 2007, http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/
2007/1007/essentials/p34.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
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including fraud and restated financials.'"8 These are avoidable crises that
sap "management time and energy for strategizing and growing the
business." 8 9 Second, companies with stronger internal financial controls
tend to experience a lower cost of capital.' 90 Stronger internal financial
controls tend to result in fewer intentional and unintentional errors in
financial reporting, and consequently a decrease in the information risk
faced by investors.19'
Hopefully, the Dodd-Frank Act's permanent exemption from
section 404's auditor attestation requirement for smaller publicly-traded
companies will not undercut the very valid purpose of the internal
controls requirement-companies should seek to improve work
processes related to gathering and analyzing financial data. As discussed
further in Section IV, small, privately held businesses that implement
best practices in internal controls should be rewarded with easier access
to equity and debt capital.192
2. Independent Advisors
Small businesses with significant private equity investments are
likely to have adopted at least independence principles and may have
independent advisors for audit, accounting, compensation and risk
management issues.193 Smaller businesses may consider the purpose of
the independence requirements. The underlying principle behind the
independence requirement is that committee independence enhances
oversight. Also, these provisions are less costly to implement. Even sole
proprietor businesses financed with microloans may benefit from
independent advisors.
Also, business structure matters. Separating the chief executive
officer and board chair would not be possible in a sole proprietorship.
However, some business owners that may not otherwise seek outside





191. See Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife, Daniel W. Collins, William R. Kinney, Jr., Ryan
LaFond, The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of
Equity, 47 J. ACCT. REs. 1 (2009).
192. See infra Section IV.
193. See generally Glynn D. Key, Private Company Corporate Governance: Closing
the Gap with Public Companies (2006), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com (type
"Private Company Corporate Governance" into search box, then click on link entitled
"keybicIO7_cropped.pdf.")
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3. Disclosure
In a closely-held business, a shareholders' agreement may govern
compensation, appointment of executives and other matters usually
within the discretion of the board of directors.19 4  In addition,
compensation in the event of a sale of the business would be covered in
the agreement between the founders and early investors of the business
and the acquirer. Therefore, to a certain degree, shareholders in closely
held businesses already may have a say-on-pay and a say-on-golden-
parachutes. To the extent that minority shareholders do not have access
to information about compensation, the Dodd-Frank Act's say-on-pay
and say-on-golden-parachute provisions establish disclosure norms that
may empower minority shareholders in closely-held businesses.
Questions about executive compensation-such as whether it is
excessive and whether it is tied to performance-may arise. As
discussed in the previous section, independent advisers may go far to
alleviate concerns regarding best practices and business norms in setting
compensation.
4. The Shareholder Voting Franchise in a Closely-Held Business
Privately-held businesses do not face the same proxy access
challenges as publicly-traded businesses face. Shareholder
representation on boards would be negotiated by venture capital or
private equity companies as part of the investment agreement. If a
dispute arose between shareholders regarding who should serve on the
board, the minority shareholders could argue that their nominee should
be included on the ballot. However, the shareholders' agreement often
controls the outcome if the case should go to court. 195 Further, the point
may be moot unless the minority shareholders hold enough shares to
elect the director.
IV. FACILITATING POSITIVE OUTCOMES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
Approximately one year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
President Obama invited Wall Street to participate in formulating
financial industry reforms.' 96 Shortly after President Obama's Federal
194. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a) (1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
350 (2010).
195. See generally Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling,
53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947) (analyzing an arbitrator's agreement governing shareholder
voting rights).
196. See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on
Financial Rescue and Reform (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
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Hall speech on Wall Street, small business advocates met with
administration officials, including Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner,
members of Congress and lenders to find ways to help so-called Main
Street businesses weather the tough economic times. Most of the
recommendations from the Small Business Financing Forum dealt with
funding mechanisms and tax credits.'9 7
The SEC acknowledges that small businesses may not be in the
same position as larger businesses-that one size does not fit all. 98
However, the SEC should continue to go beyond acknowledgment and
more actively consider that firms that it does not expressly regulate may
be impacted by trickle-down. The SEC should use the tools it has used
in the past to help regulated small businesses achieve positive outcomes
under the new reforms. These tools include delaying compliance
dates,' 99 exempting certain businesses, 200 communicating SEC and other
initiatives to small business owners and interest groups, and learning
about the needs of small businesses through forums.2 0'
Also, the SEC should work with other regulators in several ways to
help nonregulated businesses achieve positive outcomes. For example,
the SEC could work with the Small Business Administration ("SBA")
and accounting industry groups such as the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants to identify best practices in corporate
governance for small businesses. Early adopters could be eligible for
better SBA and bank loan terms 202. A second example is that the SEC
could work with the Internal Revenue Service and the states to provide
federal and state tax credits both to early adopters and to angel and other
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the press office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Financial-
Rescue-and-Reform-at-Federal-Hall).
197. See generally Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 53 A.2d at 441
(1947).
198. See generally Nancy M. Morris, Internal Control over Financial Reporting in
Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 33-8731, 29-30 (Aug. 9, 2006),
available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-87 3 1.pdf.
199. See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Approves
One-Year Extension for Small Businesses from Auditor Attestation Requirement in
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-116.htm; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
200. See Kenji Taneda, Sarbanes-Oxley, Foreign Issuers and United States Securities
Regulation, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 715 (2003).
201. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
202. See Richard Bendis post to Innovation America, SBA and Treasury Small
Business Financing Forum Recommendations, Nov. 23, 2009, http://innovation
america.us/index.php/innovation-daily/ 1388-sba-and-treasury-small-business-financing-
forum-recommendations (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (more than half of the states have
created tax incentive programs to encourage high net worth individuals to invest in early
stage companies).
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investors in early stage businesses.2 03 A variety of tax credit and earned
tax credit transfer programs were discussed at the Small Business
Financing Forum. The availability of the credit could be tied to
compliance with corporate governance standards.
The Small Business Association has set up two different funding
opportunities for qualified small businesses to enhance their company's
research and development.2 04 The two programs are the Small Business
Innovative Research Program (SBIR) and the Small Business
Technology Transfer Program (STTR).205 In order to qualify, the
business must be American-Owned, for profit, and have no more than
500 employees.206 The SBIR program requires the principal researcher be
employed by the small business, but the SBTT does not have that
requirement.2 07 Both programs award three phases of funding based on
the small business' qualification, degree of innovation, technical merit
and future market potential.208 Neither program currently takes into
account a company's governance measures. 20 9 Taking into account the
state of our economy and the importance of small businesses to our
economy, funding of this nature should take these measures into account.
A small business that is not run properly should not be permitted to take
funding opportunities from companies that have proper governance
measures in place. Taking these measures into account would allow
funding to be dispersed to the small business that truly will benefit our
economy in the long run.
In an effort to lessen the financial burden of small businesses,
President Obama has urged Congress to act on both the Small Business
Lending Fund Act of 2010 (H.R. 5297) and the Small Business Jobs Tax
Relief Act of 2010 (H.R. 5486).210 Both bills undoubtedly would benefit
small businesses. However, to what businesses would these benefits go?
As it stands now, the bills do not look at a company's governance
measures in any way. 2 1 1 As has been previously discussed, a business
203. See id.
204. See SBIR-STTR, U.S. Small Business Association (2010),





208. Id. (each small business applying for a program must submit a proposal
discussing their customers and competition, their market and their plans for securing
assistance/mentoring necessary to further their technological goals).
209. Id. (at this time the proposal has no requirement or acknowledgement of a
company's governance measures).
210. See Small Business Lending Fund Act of 2010, H.R. 5297 (2010); Small
Business Jobs Tax Relief Act of 2010, H.R. 5486 (2010).
211. Id.
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with proper governance measures in place not only will benefit our
economy, but also will be of less risk for lenders.212 One way to insert
these thoughts into the bill would be to provide certain incentives for
companies employing proper governance measures. These incentives
could include easier standards for obtaining the loans and better rates and
terms on those loans.2 13 Taking these matters into account would be a
great help for small businesses employing proper governance standards.
In addition, the well-governed businesses would benefit the most.
Finally, the SEC could continue to use its forums to convey a
message: financial regulatory reform has value beyond its express terms.
It should promote greater scrutiny of corporate governance practices and
provide tangible and intangible benefits. Small businesses not subject to
the Dodd-Frank Act's requirements are uniquely situated to be able to
adopt corporate governance practices that provide real benefits to
shareholders and other stakeholders.
V. CONCLUSION
"No law can force anyone to be responsible. . . . Regulators will
have to be vigilant in order for these new rules to be effective."2 14
In his speech upon signing the Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama
emphasized that what happens on Wall Street-in the stock and credit
markets-affects Main Street, and vice versa.2 15 Similarly, Wall Street
financial reforms impact Main Street business norms. When Sarbanes-
Oxley was adopted, "many claimed that regardless of the intent of
Congress, these guidelines would eventually permeate all businesses
under the guise of best practices." 2 16 This Article makes a similar claim
about the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulation that will be promulgated
under the statute. Many of the reforms will change best practices, or
perhaps affirm that some practices already in place are indeed the best
212. See Sanjeev Bhojraj and Partha Sengupta, Effect of Corporate Governance on
Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors, 76 J.
Bus. 3, 21(2003), available at ftp://ftp.cba.uri.edu/Classes/Tong/phd/
corpGovernance2.pdf (discussing how companies with proper governance measures
(proper stock holders and board members are getting better rates because they are found
to be a lower risk).
213. Id.
214. See Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and




216. See Paul D. Broude and Richard L. Prebil, Foley & Lardner LLP, The Impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on Private and Nonprofit Companies, 2, 2005 National Directors
Institute Executive Summary, available at http://www.directorsandboards.com/ ndi.pdf.
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practices for all businesses--expressly subject to the reforms or not-to
consider if not follow to the letter.
It is to be expected that regulation of the Dodd-Frank Act's size and
scope will cause unforeseen reactions in the business community. The
first unforeseen reaction occurred on July 22, 2010, one day after the
Dodd-Frank Act was signed. 2 17 Effective July 22, the Dodd-Frank Act
repealed Securities Act Rule 436(g) ("Rule 436(g)") that exempted rating
agencies from expert liability for untrue statements in registration
statements.218 "As a result, disclosure of a rating in a registration
statement requires inclusion of the consent by the rating agency to be
named as an expert." 2 19 In effect, Rule 436(g) afforded asset-backed
securities ("ABS") issuers (e.g., subprime loans) and other securities
issuers an exemption from obtaining consent before using ratings from
firms such as Moody's Investor Service, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch
Ratings (collectively, the "NRSROs"). 22 0 The NRSROs were aware of
Rule 436(g)'s possible repeal for many months. However, the NRSROs
reacted to Rule 436(g)'s repeal by continuing to rate new issues but
refusing to consent to the use of the ratings in registration statements.22 1
"A few non-mortgage public ABS deals already in the works were
withdrawn by their sponsors and the usual suspects proclaimed Congress
had achieved the unintended consequence of smothering the ABS market
and stifling consumer credit."2 22 (Emphasis added.) The SEC responded
217. See Linda Lowell, There Was a Surprise in the Dodd-Frank Act?, HousingWire:
Financial News for the Mortgage Market, (2010), available at http://www.housing
wire.com/2010/07/26/there-was-a-surprise-in-the-dodd-frank-act.
218. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 939(g) (2010) (repealing Rule 436(g) under the Securities Act of 1933).
219. See Ford Motor Credit Company No-Action Letter, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, July 22, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/cf-noaction/20 1 0/ford072210-11 20.htm.
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 436(g) (2006)
[T]he security rating assigned to a class of debt securities, a class of convertible
debt securities, or a class of preferred stock by a nationally recognized
statistical rating organization . . . shall not be considered a part of the
registration statement prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of
sections 7 and 11 of the Act.
(In effect, Rule 436(g) exempted rating agencies from liability for material misstatements
and omissions in bond registration statements. The Dodd-Frank Act repeals this
exemption, exposing rating agencies to liability for materially untrue ratings); see
Gregory A. Fernicola, Stacy J. Kanter, Joshua B. Goldstein, Dodd-Frank Act Rescinds
Exemptions Under Rule 436(g), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Publications, July 23, 2010, available at http://www.skadden.com/
Index.cfn?contentlD=5 1 &itemlD=2172.
221. See Linda Lowell, There Was a Surprise in the Dodd-Frank Act?, HousingWire:
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to the "kerfluffle" by stating in a July 22, 2010 no-action letter to Ford
Motor Credit Company LLC that the SEC will not enforce the "consent-
and-disclose" rule if an ABS issuer omits the disclosure; the SEC's no-
action position expires after six month.223 Also, the SEC issued a
handful of interpretations of exemptions to the consent requirement.224
Moreover, the SEC had issued a "concept release" in October 2009 that
discussed the possibility of repealing Rule 436(g), the history of and
rationale for the rule requiring experts to consent to the disclosure of
their statements and opinions in registration statements, expert liability
for untrue statements and omissions, and defenses that experts may
raise. 22 5 Going forward, the SEC "will require issuers to file the consent
of a rating agency named in a registration statement that includes credit
rating information." 22 6
This paper does not seek to advise policy makers on managing
unforeseen reactions such as the retaliatory measures adopted by the
NRSROs in response to the repeal of Rule 436(g). Instead, it seeks to
help policy makers, educators, entrepreneurs and service providers take
steps now to ensure that the new reforms are implemented in a
constructive manner and in a way that will serve to strengthen small
businesses and ultimately our economy. The reaction of NRSROs to the
Dodd Frank Act obfuscates the fact that the main value in the corporate
governance provisions may be found "in the principles on which it is
based."2 27
223. See Ford Motor Credit Company No-Action Letter, supra note 219.
224. See What's New in the Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (2009) available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
cfnew.shtml.
225. See Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under the Securities
Act of 1933, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (October 7, 2009; October 22,
2009) available at http://sec.gov/rules/concept/conceptarchive/concept arch2009.shtmi.
226. See Femicola, Kanter, & Goldstein, supra note 220.
227. Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX
Undermine its Benefits?, 39 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 595, 596 (2008).
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